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We  use a pooled  panel  bootstrap  procedure  and  different  benchmark  models  of per-
formance  to investigate  presence  of skill  in  mutual  fund  performance  across  different
investment  styles  based  on  Swedish  data  from  February  2007  to March  2015.  To  check
robustness,  we  apply  serial  correlation,  unit  root,  and  variance  ratio  tests  to examine  the
predictability  and  market  efﬁciency  of gross  and net excess  returns.  The  results  suggest  that
Swedish  funds  underperform  their  benchmarks,  net  of costs.  In  addition,  very  few  managers
outperform  the  market,  and  too many  managers  underperform  the  market  due  to  good  and
bad  skills  rather  than good  or bad  luck.
©  2016  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  Inc. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
One of the most remarkable ﬁnancial developments in the last two  decades is the rapid growth of the mutual fund
industry, which has the potential to become the most important ﬁnancial institution for households, exceeding banks and
insurance companies. This is particularly true in Sweden, where total net assets of mutual funds grew from SEK 127 billion
in 1992 to over SEK 3 trillion in 2015 (an average annual growth rate of 15.4%). Today, about 80% of Swedes contribute to
mutual funds in addition to their fund-based premium pension savings, around 60% of Swedish children have savings in
mutual funds, nearly 90% of Swedish ﬁrms have investment fund holdings, and more than 30% of household ﬁnancial assets,
of which pensions account for a signiﬁcant part, are investment-fund based.1
An array of factors helps explain the unprecedented growth of the Swedish mutual fund assets. The aging of the Swedish
population has certainly played an important role in boosting the popularity of mutual fund products. Increasing longevity
and limited projected state pensions are causing an anticipated ‘savings gap’. This raises households’ concerns over whether
voluntary saving in mutual and pension funds will be sufﬁcient to ﬁll this gap, giving those reaching retirement age acceptable
savings to afford a satisfactory standard of living. Tax incentives and regulations are other factors behind the rapid growth
of Swedish mutual funds, particularly bond and money market funds; mutual fund returns are taxed at 20%, which is
lower than the 30% rate applicable to other capital gains. Mutual funds also offer signiﬁcant cost beneﬁts for institutional
investors because they can negotiate lower fees, unlike individual investors. Finally, access to managerial expertise is another
factor that has fueled the explosive growth of mutual funds in recent years, although the empirical research has generally
demonstrated that actively managed mutual funds do not outperform a random walk pick from the market or passive
(index/tracker) funds.
E-mail address: maher.asal@hv.se
1 See Swedish Investment Fund Association’s annual report 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2016.07.001
0148-6195/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
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Two key questions on fund performance have dominated recent academic and policy debates. The ﬁrst is whether the
verage risk-adjusted abnormal fund rate of return (net of costs) is positive, negative or zero. The second is related to
he persistence of abnormal performance and whether it can be identiﬁed ex ante (i.e., attributed to skill or luck). The
mpirical ﬁndings, using mainly US data, are mixed. On the one hand, an extensive literature holds the view that active
utual fund managers lack skill. This literature suggests little or no superior performance but somewhat stronger evidence
f underperformance. In other words, active funds underperform passive funds, and on average, mutual fund returns before
ees are random. Consequently, active managers do not have the skills required to beat the market (e.g., Carhart, 1997; Fama,
965, 1970; Fletcher & Forbes, 2002; Jensen, 1968; Pastor & Stambaugh, 2002). On the other hand, other studies suggest that
 handful of fund managers have superior stock-picking skills (e.g., Berk & Van Binsbergen, 2013; Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, &
’Sullivan, 2008; Berk & Green, 2004; Ippolito, 1989; Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, & White, 2006). Although most
ecent studies testing for performance persistence use US fund data, few studies use Swedish data, despite its growing
mportance in recent years. The present study contributes to the literature by focusing on Swedish mutual funds during the
eriod 2007–2015.2
The purpose of the paper is twofold. Firstly, it examines the performance of 185 universal open-end, 37 equity, and
1 hedge funds in Sweden during the period from February 2007 to March 2015. We use three models of performance
easurement: CAPM, the three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which captures Jegadeesh and
itman (1993) one-year momentum anomaly. Secondly, it uses a pooled panel bootstrap methodology to distinguish between
luck’ and ‘skill’ for individual funds. This methodology allows explicitly to controls for luck versus skill without imposing
n ex-ante parametric distribution from which fund returns are assumed to be drawn. This procedure was  ﬁrst applied to
S mutual funds by Kosowski et al. (2006) and Timmermann and Granger (2004).
In contrast to earlier studies which use merely standard statistical measures, often applied to portfolios of funds, we
ombine statistical performance analysis with predictability capabilities based on market efﬁciency to better measure man-
gerial skill. We  argue that if a market is fully efﬁcient and any new information is directly and correctly incorporated into
nancial markets, it would be impossible for any fund manager to persistently outperform the market. Thus, if a manager
as talent, past returns predict future returns. To avoid a spurious result from relying on only one test, three techniques
re conducted for testing for market efﬁciency, i.e., serial correlation, unit root, and variance ration tests. To the best of our
nowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that combines statistical measures with predictability procedures to examine the presence
f skill in mutual fund performance.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the mutual fund literature. Section 3 presents the models of performance
easurement used in this paper. Section 4 presents the empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
. Mutual fund literature
The empirical literature on mutual fund performance focuses on the ability of funds to outperform, equal, or underperform
he market and the extent to which this performance persists. The vast majority of the empirical literature is based on
S mutual fund data, and the evidence is mixed. Many studies hold the view that active mutual fund managers cannot
eat the market. These studies are rooted in Jensen (1968), who  used data for 125 mutual funds from 1945 to 1964 and
ound that mutual funds could not earn enough returns to cover their costs. Jensen’s ﬁndings are in line with the Efﬁcient
arket Hypothesis (Fama, 1970; Sharpe, 1966). Carhart (1997) used US mutual found data and found that common factors
n stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds’ mean and risk-
djusted returns. He used the net alpha earned by investors to measure managerial skill and concluded that there was
o evidence of skilled or informed mutual fund managers. Fama and French (2010) also used alpha measures to obtain a
ross-sectional distribution of managerial talent for the aggregate portfolio of U.S. equity mutual funds. Their bootstrap
imulations yield no evidence that managers have enough skill to cover costs. When they added cost, they found evidence
f inferior and superior performance (non-zero true ) in the extreme tails of the cross-section of mutual fund  estimates.
lake and Timmermann (2014) examined the performance of 2300 UK open-end mutual funds over a 23-year period. They
ound evidence of underperformance on a risk-adjusted basis by the average fund manager as well as evidence that the
nderperformance persists. Quigley and Sinqueﬁeld (2000) examined the performance of all UK unit trusts that concentrate
heir investments in UK equities for the period January 1978–December 1997. They compared the returns of these unit
rusts with a three-factor model that takes into account their exposure to market, value and size risk. They found that
fter subtracting expenses, managers underperform the market and that small-company trusts are the worst performers.
oreover, net of expenses, good performance does not consistently persist, but bad performance does.
Despite the widespread acceptance that managers lack talent, there are studies that ﬁnd evidence of skill. One of the ﬁrst
apers is by Grinblatt and Titman (1989), who found persistent differences in performance between funds and linked this
o the ability of fund managers to earn abnormal returns. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) examined how active management
s related to characteristics such as fund size, expenses, and turnover in the cross-section as well as the evolution of active
anagement over time. They ﬁnd evidence that active management predicts fund performance, i.e., the funds with the
2 In 2015 a net total of SEK 84 billion was invested in investment funds and the total fund assets under management increased with SEK 244 billion to
EK  3 246 billion, which represents the highest year end ﬁgure ever recorded. See the Swedish Investment Fund Association’s annual report 2015.
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highest active management signiﬁcantly outperform their benchmark indices both before and after expenses, and that the
preeminence of the managers persist. Kosowski et al. (2006) use a bootstrap statistical technique to examine the performance
of U.S. open-end, domestic-equity mutual fund performance over the period 1975–2002. They ﬁnd that a few managers are
able to outperform the market after including expenses and that the superiority of the managers persists.
Berk and Van Binsbergen (2013) examined the performance of US mutual funds using the value that a mutual fund
extracts from capital markets as a measure of skill rather than a return measure (alpha) for the period January 1962–March
2011. They found large cross-sectional differences in skill that persist for as long as 10 years. They also found that better funds
earn higher fees and that there is a positive correlation between current manager compensation and future performance.
Wermers (2000) found that the stocks held by mutual funds outperform broad market indices. Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers
(2000) investigated the value of active mutual fund management by examining the stock trades of mutual funds. They found
that stocks purchased by funds have signiﬁcantly higher returns than the stocks (large, small, value, or growth) they sell. In
addition, growth-oriented funds exhibit better stock selection skills than income-oriented funds, and funds with the best
past performance have better stock-picking skills than funds with the worst past performance. Kacperczyk et al. (2011)
found evidence for stock picking in booms and for market timing in recessions; they also found that the same fund managers
who pick stocks well in bull markets also time the market well in bear market conditions. Hence, these fund managers
signiﬁcantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks. Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) found that funds sold directly,
that is, funds not marketed by brokers, do not underperform index funds after fees. Finally, Malkiel (1995) studied the
performance of actively managed mutual funds in the US from 1990 to 2009. He found that only a small number of funds
can outperform their benchmarks and that this superiority in performance is due to luck and not skill. His typical advice for
investors is to invest in low-expense index funds.
Another strand of the empirical literature focuses on the role that the level of fees and trading activities play in fund
performance. The typical conclusion is that funds that underperform have very high expense ratios, while funds that out-
perform tend to have low expense ratios (Carhart, 1997; Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 1996). Larger and more effective funds as
well as no-load funds are found to have lower expense ratios (Malhotra & McLeod, 1997). Finally, fund fees are also related
to investment strategies. Aggressive growth funds tend to charge higher fees (Chordia, 1996).
Despite the fact that investment in mutual funds has become a major investment for Swedish households and institutional
investors, there are very few studies on the performance and persistence of excess returns in the Swedish mutual fund
industry. Dahlquist, Engström, and Söderlind, (2000) studied the relation between fund performance and fund attributes in
the Swedish market. In their study, performance is measured as the alpha in a linear regression of fund returns on several
benchmark assets. They found good performance among small equity funds, low-fee funds, funds whose trading activity
is high, and in some cases, funds with good past performance. Their results also indicate some persistence, particularly for
money market funds, but not for the other fund categories. Flam and Vestman (2014) analyzed the performance of 115
actively managed Swedish mutual funds for the period 1999 to 2013. They found no evidence of persistence in returns or of
stock-picking skills; they also found that the selected index funds can be expected to outperform actively managed funds.
They show that average gross excess returns of actively managed Swedish equity mutual funds decreased substantially from
approximately 2001 to 2002. Average gross and net excess returns were −0.22 and −1.47% per year in 2002–2013. Engström
(2004) studied the relation between fund performance and fund managers’ investment strategy using all Swedish mutual
fund data from 1996 to 2000. They found a negative ﬁrm-size effect and a positive relation between performance and the
degree of diversiﬁcation within the fund portfolio.
3. Models of performance measurement
We  employ three models of performance measurement: the Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM), described in Sharpe (1966)
and Lintner (1965), the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which captures
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) one-year momentum anomaly. As argued by Carhart (1997), the four-factor model is consistent
with a model of market equilibrium with four risk factors; alternatively, it may  be interpreted as a performance attribution
model, where the coefﬁcients and premiums on the factor-mimicking portfolios indicate the proportion of mean returns
attributable to four elementary strategies: high versus low beta stocks, large versus small market capitalization stocks, value
versus growth stocks, and one-year return momentum versus contrarian stocks. Thus, we  estimate performance relative to
CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor models as:
ri = ˛i + ˇm (rm) + i (1)
ri = ˛i + ˇm (rm) + ˇ smb (SMB) + ˇhml (HML) + i (2)
ri = ˛i + ˇm (rm) + ˇ smb (SMB) + ˇhml (HML) + ˇmom (momentum) + i (3)
where ri is the gross or net excess fund returns i over the risk-free rate (1-month repo rate), rm is the excess market return
(the return of OMX  stocks), SMB  and HML  are the size and value-growth returns of Fama and French (1993), MOMt is the
Swedish version of Carhart (1997) momentum return, deﬁned as long on prior-year winners and short on prior-year losers,
and it is the regression residual. The parameters ˇm, ˇ smb, ˇhmlandˇmom are to be estimated. As in Fama and French (2010),
we interpret SMBt , HMLt , and MOMt as diversiﬁed passive benchmark returns that capture patterns in average returns during
our sample period.
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The parameter of interest is the signiﬁcance of ˛i because this parameter measures the average return provided by a
und in excess of the return on a comparable passive portfolio. In other words, the intercept of these regressions represents
he value the manager has added to his portfolio above what could be justiﬁed by market risk and made by these known
trategies. This coefﬁcient is commonly known as Jensen’s alpha; a positive and signiﬁcant intercept (true ) is viewed as
utperformance, and a negative and signiﬁcant intercept is viewed as underperformance. From an investment point of view,
he Jensen’s alpha on the explanatory returns in (1–3) describe a diversiﬁed portfolio of passive benchmarks (including the
isk-free security) that replicates the exposures of the fund to common factors in returns. Thus, the null hypotheses is given
y: H0 : ˛i = 0 . A positive and signiﬁcant ˛i for a given fund would suggest that the fund is able to earn signiﬁcant abnormal
eturns in excess of the market-required return for a fund of this given risk.
. Empirical evidence
.1. Data and descriptive statistics
The data we use for this study are from Datastream and the MCSI Database. Our data consist of 185 universal open-end,
7 equity, and 21 hedge funds during the period February 2007–March 2015. The minimum number of consecutive monthly
eturns required for a fund to be included is 96 months. Funds that meet the requirement but have been closed and merged
ith other funds are included to avoid survival bias. The gross fund return is calculated as the ﬁrst difference log of the price
f individual funds (e.g., NAV/# of shares). The net return is calculated by subtracting the total expense ratio (TER) from the
ross return for each fund.
.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for 185 Swedish open-end mutual funds (all funds) with all investment objectives
Panel A), 37 equity funds (panel B) and 21 hedge funds (panel C) for the period February 2007–March 2015. The gross
onthly return (RI) and net monthly return (NETRI) are compared to the monthly risk-free return (RFM), equity market
eturn and other return-based classiﬁcations that are widely used in the investment management industry. Speciﬁcally, we
ompare the performance of these funds with investment strategy based on large, small, large-value, large-growth, small-
alue and small-growth stocks listed on the OMX  database. The Sharpe ratio for each fund is also calculated as the ratio of
he fund’s excess return divided by its standard deviation as in the world of Markowitz (1952).
We highlight three points. First, on average, only equity funds produce a higher gross monthly rate of return than the mar-
et. After subtracting the expense ratio, the results suggest that all Swedish mutual funds included in our data underperform
heir benchmarks, net of costs. For example, the average monthly market return of 0.44% is much higher than net monthly
eturns of 0.10, −0.55, and −0.83, for all open-end, equity, and hedge funds, respectively. Second, small value (RSMALV)
as the highest average return, above 0.70% per month, but the average values of the monthly small growth (RSMALG) and
arket return (RM) are also large, above 0.70% and 0.40%, respectively. In addition, the value of the Sharpe ratio is highest for
mall growth and small value, 7.7% and 7.6% per month, respectively. Third, because many statistical inferences require that
 distribution be symmetrical and normal or nearly normal, we report the values of skewness and kurtosis. The table also
eports a more solid test, the Jarque–Bera test, to investigate the hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution. The
ull hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero. The results show that the
alue of the Jarque-Bera test statistic exceeds the critical values (reported below the table) for any reasonable signiﬁcance
evel, the value of the skewness exceeds 0, and the value of kurtosis is far higher than 3. Thus, we may  conclude that the
onthly returns do not follow a normal distribution.
Table 2 shows cross-fund descriptive statistics of excess returns above the risk-free rate categorized by value. As shown,
he average excess monthly returns (both gross and net) vary considerably across funds. For all funds (panel A), some funds
ave gross and net returns as low as −0.04% and −0.11%, and other funds have gross and net returns as high as 0.12% and
0.20%, respectively. For equity funds (panel B), some funds have gross and net excess returns as low as −0.41% and −2.06%,
nd other funds have gross and next excess returns as high as 1.23% and 0.52%, respectively. For hedge funds (panel C), some
unds have gross and net excess returns as low as −0.24% and −2.36%, and other funds have gross and net excess returns as
igh as 0.63% and −0.30%, respectively. Interestingly, none of the hedge funds produced a positive net excess return under
ur sample period. Fig. 1 shows a histogram of the gross and net excess return of all funds (panel A), equity funds (panel B),
nd hedge funds (panel C). The ﬁgures conﬁrm the above ﬁndings that most funds yield a negative net excess return. The
esults also suggest that only a few equity funds succeeded in generating a positive net excess return.
.3. Regression results
Panel A of Table 3 shows the regression intercepts ( estimates) for all funds using the CAPM, three- and four-factor
ariants of gross and net (after deducting fund expenses) excess returns. Focusing on the four-factor model (Eq. (3)), the
esults reveal three important facts. First, the intercept (), which summarizes the average performance of funds relative to
ifferent risk factors, is signiﬁcantly positive for gross excess returns and negative for net excess returns. The values of the
oefﬁcient () in the four-factor model were 0.078% (t = 2.299) and −0.242% (t = −8.239), which are signiﬁcant at the 10% and
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Swedish open-end Mutual Funds, Equity Funds and Hedge Funds for period Februarys 2007 to March 2015.
Panel A: All Funds RI NETRI RFM RM RLARGE RSMAL RLARGEV RLARGEG RSMALV RSMALG
Mean 0,33 0,1 0,24 0,44 0,48 0,71 0,42 0,54 0,74 0,73
Median 0,44 0,2 0,24 1,13 0,49 0,17 0,78 0,84 0,46 0,55
Maximum 41,1 40,92 0,24 15,26 17,78 26,61 17,59 18,43 25,81 27,87
Minimum −41, −41,94 0,24 −14,67 −18,05 −23,01 −18,83 −16,53 −20,8 −25,02
Std.  Dev. 4,81 4,81 0 5,24 5,45 6,31 5,69 5,71 6,61 6,33
Skewness −1,2 −1,24 NA −0,44 −0,65 −0,07 −0,6 −0,45 0,02 −0,17
Kurtosis 11,6 11,61 NA 4,16 5,12 6,86 5,13 4,12 5,38 8,13
Jarque-Bera 5940 5942 NA 1571 4583 11045 4406 1510 4199 19576
Probability 0 0 NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sharp  Ratio 0,01 −0,029 0,038 0,044 0,074 0,032 0,053 0,076 0,077
Observations 1775 17754 17754 17754 17754 17754 17754 17754 17754 17754
Panel  B: Equity Funds
Mean 0,57 −0,55 0,24 0,42 0,42 0,76 0,42 0,52 0,71 0,71
Median 0,7 −0,4 0,24 1,11 0,86 0,17 0,86 0,84 0,46 0,55
Maximum 73,8 72,4 0,24 18,9 17,59 26,61 17,59 23,23 32,79 31,64
Minimum −40,3 −41,89 0,24 −14,67 −18,83 −23,01 −18,83 −16,53 −20,8 −25,02
Std.  Dev. 6,01 6,03 0 5,23 5,69 6,26 5,69 5,71 6,61 6,34
Skewness 0,21 0,19 NA −0,44 −0,61 −0,04 −0,61 −0,44 0,04 −0,16
Kurtosis 11,8 11,63 NA 4,2 5,14 6,95 5,14 4,15 5,51 8,21
Jarque-Bera 1084 10352 NA 306 838 2164 838 291 873 3785
Probability 0 0 NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sharp  Ratio 0,00 0,006 0,016 0,013 0,010 0,013 0,015 0,012 0,010
Observations 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332 3332
Panel  C: Hedge Funds
Mean 0,26 −0,83 0,24 0,45 0,16 0,25 0,43 0,56 0,76 0,74
Median 0,21 −0,72 0,24 1,13 0,48 0,16 0,95 0,86 0,47 0,72
Maximum 23,5 21,19 0,24 15,26 17,78 26,61 17,59 18,43 25,81 27,87
Minimum −25, −27,75 0,24 −14,67 −26,28 −38,12 −18,83 −16,53 −20,8 −25,02
Std.  Dev. 3,17 3,2 0 5,26 6,08 7,41 5,7 5,71 6,64 6,36
Skewness −0,82 −1,11 NA −0,45 −1,16 −1,29 −0,6 −0,45 0,01 −0,17
Kurtosis 16,5 16,61 NA 4,15 6,79 10,79 5,13 4,13 5,36 8,11
Jarque-Bera 1535 15723 NA 175 1636 5571 493 172 461 2165
Probability 0 0 NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sharp  Ratio 0,00 −0,334 0,040 −0,013 0,001 0,033 0,056 0,078 0,079
Observations 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983
Panel A reports the results for all investment objectives, Panel B for equity funds and Panel C for Hedge funds. Where RI is the gross average monthly
return  on managed portfolio i, NETRI is the net return deﬁned as gross monthly return minus T-bill return, RFM is the monthly risk-free rate, RM is the
value-weighted aggregate equity market proxy portfolio, and RLARGE, RSMAL, RSMAL, RLARGEV, RLARGEG, RSMALV, and RSMALG are monthly returns
on  large, small, large-value, large-growth, small-value and small-growth, respectively. The critical values of The Jarque-Bera test for the for the chi-square
distribution as: 4.61 5.99, 9.21 for signiﬁcance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
5% signiﬁcance level, for the gross and net excess returns, respectively. The sign and the signiﬁcance of () are almost the
same in the three-factor model as well. Second, as expected, the average values of the monthly market premium (RM − Rf)
have the highest average returns, 0.475% per month (t = 48.5) and 0.485% per month (t = 60,973), which are signiﬁcant at the
1% level for gross and net excess returns, respectively. The coefﬁcients of the value-growth returns (HML) are also signiﬁcant,
0.05% (t = 5.595) and 0.017% (t = 2.272), for gross and net excess returns, respectively. The coefﬁcients of the size of returns,
SMB, are also signiﬁcant at 0.063% (t = 5.352) and 0.069% (t = 11.203) for gross and net excess returns, respectively. Finally, the
coefﬁcients of the momentum factor (MOM) are signiﬁcant, with average values of 0.041% (t = 2.286) and 0.055% (t = 5.434)
for the gross and net excess returns, respectively.
The results for equity and hedge funds shown in Panels B and C, respectively, are similar to previously estimated values
for all funds except in two aspects. First, the positive sign of () for gross excess return is negative but insigniﬁcant at any
signiﬁcance level, −0.019% (t = −0.196) and −0.061% (t = −0,921), for equity and hedge funds, respectively. Second, the sign for
the value-growth excess return (HML) has turned negative for equity funds, −0.319% (t = −10.28) and −0.324% (t = −10.418),
for gross and net excess returns, respectively. Finally, the size return, SMB, has turned negative but insigniﬁcant for hedge
funds, −0.006% per month (t = −0.345) and −0.004 (t = −0,855), for gross and net excess returns, respectively.
To shed light on the persistence of Swedish fund performance over time, we re-estimated the four-factor model for
two sub-periods, from February 2007 to February 2010 and from March 2010 to March 2015. Table 4 reports the result for
these two sub-periods. We  highlight two points for all funds (panel A). First, we  ﬁnd no evidence of persistence in gross
excess returns, while the value of the intercept  is insigniﬁcantly negative in the ﬁrst sub-period (2007–2010), −0,061%
(t = −1.047), it has become signiﬁcantly positive in the second sub-period (2010–2015), 0.078 (t = 2.99), suggesting that
outperformance of the mutual funds has become stronger over time. Second, while the value-growth excess gross return
(HMLt) is signiﬁcantly negative in the ﬁrst sub-period, −0.038% (t = −2.250), it has become signiﬁcantly positive in the second
sub-period, 0.050 (t = 5.595). Similarly, while the value-growth excess net return (HMLt) is signiﬁcantly negative in the ﬁrst
sub-period, −0.021% (t = −2.213), it has become signiﬁcantly positive in the second sub-period, 0.050 (t = 5.595).
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Table  2
Descriptive Statistics for Excess Return Categorized by Values Across Funds.
Panel A: All Funds
Gross Excess Return Net Excess Return
CROSSID Mean Std, Dev, Obs, CROSSID Mean Std, Dev, Obs,
[0,50) 0,12 4,81 4703 [0,50) −0,12 4,81 4703
[50,100) 0,12 5,09 4800 [50,100) −0,11 5,09 4800
[100,150) 0,04 4,42 4799 [100,150) −0,20 4,42 4799
[150,200) 0,11 4,94 3452 [150,200) −0,13 4,94 3452
All  0,10 4,81 17754 All −0,14 4,81 17754
Panel  B: Equity Funds Panel C: Hedge Funds
Gross Excess Return Net Excess Return Gross Excess Return Net Excess Return
ID Mean Std Obs ID Mean Std Obs ID Mean Std Obs ID Mean Std Obs
1 0,45 5,14 96 1 −0,11 5,11 96 1 −0,13 2,24 96 1 −1,18 2,24 96
2  0,42 10,37 95 2 −0,98 10,38 95 2 0,23 2,28 96 2 −0,82 2,28 96
3  0,18 5,94 95 3 −0,14 5,93 95 3 0,00 1,31 96 3 −0,70 1,31 96
4  −0,13 6,93 95 4 −1,27 6,89 95 4 −0,24 1,29 96 4 −0,99 1,29 96
5  0,32 5,91 94 5 −1,09 5,91 94 5 0,11 3,77 95 5 −2,21 3,77 95
6  −0,02 2,88 95 6 −1,53 2,89 95 6 0,05 1,28 96 6 −0,97 1,28 96
7  −0,41 4,13 95 7 −1,01 4,11 95 7 −0,02 2,28 96 7 −1,03 2,28 96
8  0,42 6,61 95 8 −0,85 6,62 95 8 −0,23 1,51 96 8 −1,23 1,51 96
9  0,55 5,74 81 9 0,39 5,73 81 9 0,27 5,40 96 9 −0,79 5,40 96
10  0,40 6,99 95 10 −0,89 7,00 95 10 0,40 5,07 96 10 −0,63 5,06 96
11  0,45 6,54 95 11 −0,80 6,54 95 11 −0,07 1,73 96 11 −1,17 1,72 96
12  0,19 6,21 95 12 −0,08 6,19 95 12 −0,23 0,87 96 12 −0,33 0,87 96
13  0,17 5,93 95 13 −2,06 6,03 95 13 0,63 6,00 96 13 −2,37 6,00 96
14  0,49 6,21 95 14 −1,14 6,20 95 14 −0,06 1,32 96 14 −0,30 1,32 96
15  0,37 6,29 95 15 −0,49 6,26 95 15 −0,70 3,35 96 15 −1,48 3,35 96
16  0,53 5,54 95 16 −0,21 5,55 95 16 0,58 4,72 96 16 −0,40 4,72 96
17  0,26 5,46 95 17 −0,48 5,47 95 17 −0,04 1,85 96 17 −1,04 1,85 96
18  0,15 5,59 95 18 −0,50 5,59 95 18 −0,02 2,82 93 18 −1,02 2,82 93
19  −0,17 6,84 95 19 −0,89 6,80 95 19 0,02 1,44 88 19 −1,85 1,44 88
20  0,22 5,58 95 20 −1,05 5,59 95 20 −0,07 5,28 86 20 −1,07 5,28 86
21  1,23 5,58 73 21 0,52 5,58 73 21 0,11 1,88 85 21 −0,89 1,88 85
22  0,20 5,38 95 22 −1,01 5,46 95 All 0,03 3,17 1983 All −1,07 3,20 1983
23  0,08 5,99 95 23 −0,63 5,96 95
24  0,35 5,88 95 24 −0,88 5,92 95
25  0,37 5,88 95 25 −1,10 5,86 95
26  0,10 6,44 87 26 −1,33 6,44 87
27  0,28 5,91 94 27 −1,36 5,94 93
28  0,33 6,20 94 28 −1,08 6,20 94
29  0,51 6,23 94 29 −0,89 6,23 94
30  0,91 5,81 74 30 −0,53 5,83 74
31  0,89 4,39 51 31 −0,69 4,38 51
32  0,25 5,80 95 32 −1,25 5,79 95
33  0,31 5,92 95 33 −0,33 5,84 95
34  0,60 4,84 95 34 0,27 4,85 85
35  0,28 5,93 95 35 −0,99 5,97 95
36  0,48 6,39 95 36 −1,22 6,43 95
e
s
h
v
s
(
s
C
s
s37  1,12 3,84 35 37 −0,76 3,85 35
All  0,32 6,01 3343 All −0,79 6,03 3332
For equity funds (panel B), there is persistence of outperformance of gross excess returns and underperformance of net
xcess returns over time. In addition, while the value-growth excess net return (HML) is signiﬁcantly positive in the ﬁrst
ub-period, 0.154% (t = 11.48), it becomes signiﬁcantly negative in the second sub-period, −0.026 (t = −3.257). Finally, for
edge funds (panel C), no persistence can be found in the alpha for either gross or net excess returns. For example, while the
alue of the intercept  of gross returns is insigniﬁcantly positive in the ﬁrst sub-period 0.009% (t = −0.716), it has become
igniﬁcantly negative in the second sub-period, −0.181 (−t = 2.569). Similarly, while the value-growth excess gross return
HML) is signiﬁcantly positive in the ﬁrst sub-period, 0.108% (t = 2.864), it has become insigniﬁcantly negative in the second
ub-period, − 0.027 (t = −1.136).
In sum, and consistent with Quigley and Sinqueﬁeld (2000) and Blake and Timmermann (2014) for UK mutual Funds,
arhart (1997) and Fama and French (2010) for US mutual funds, and Flam and Vestman (2014) for Swedish funds, our result
hows that Swedish mutual funds generally underperform the market when costs are added to fund expense ratios. There is
ome positive abnormal performance by the best funds, whereas the worst funds have statistically signiﬁcant negative risk-
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adjusted performance. Furthermore, among Swedish mutual funds, there is little evidence of persistently positive abnormal
performance and stronger evidence of persistently poor performance.
4.4. Bootstrap methodology
The results above suggest that, on average, active mutual funds do not produce net returns above those of passive
benchmarks. We  now examine mutual fund performance () that explicitly controls for luck without imposing an ex ante
parametric distribution on the fund’s return. As emphasized by Kosowski et al. (2006), the bootstrap can enormously reduce
the difference between the true and the nominal probabilities of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis that no superior
fund managers exist. Furthermore, given the difﬁculty in modelling the joint distribution of mutual fund alphas across many
different funds, the bootstrap offers a striking approach to testing for performance persistence, as investors look at past
performance to infer the future.
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Table  3
Panel Least Square estimation of excess return of Swedish Mutual Funds, Equity Funds and Hedge Funds for period Februarys 2007 to March 2015.
Panel A: All Funds CAPM 3-factors 4-factors
Gross NET Gross Net Gross Net
 −0,096 −0,253 0,098 −0,14 0,078 −0,242
t-   −3,119 −5,404 2,988 −4,273 2,299 −8,239
m 0,538 0,389 0,505 0,505 0,475 0,485
t-statstics 94,676 27,058 64,053 64,053 48,5 60,973
smb 0,068 0,068 0,063 0,095
t-statstics 5,898 5,898 5,352 11,207
hml 0,053 0,053 0,05 0,017
t-statstics 6,037 6,037 5,595 2,272
mom 0,041 0,055
t-statstics 2,286 5,434
Adjusted R-squared 0,335 0,125 0,271 0,271 0,271 0,343
F-statistic 1245,4 1377,606 1377,606 1034,904 2323,205
Prob(F-statistic) 000 000 000 000 0000
Akaike  info criterion 5,272 5,265 5,265 5,264 5,559
Schwarz criterion 5,272 5,267 5,267 5,268 5,561
Durbin-Watson stat 2,309 2,314 2,314 2,309 2,161
Panel  B: Equity Funds
 0,197 −0,842 0,093 −1,017 −0,019 −1,026
t-   1,961 −8,354 0,973 −10,552 −0,196 −10,621
m 0,298 0,297 0,322 0,321 0,323 0,32
t-statstics 15,861 15,73 17,866 17,698 17,829 17,651
smb 0,367 0,368 0,368 0,367
t-statstics 13,946 13,881 13,904 13,852
hml −0,319 −0,323 −0,319 −0,324
t-statstics −10,265 −10,395 −10,28 −10,418
mom 0,022 0,029
t-statstics 0,979 1,34
Adjusted R-squared 0,07 247,42 0,157 0,157 0,157 0,157
F-statistic 252,849 247,42 208,739 207,578 156,792 156,17
Prob(F-statistic) 000 000 000 000 000 000
Akaike  info criterion 6,362 6,359 6,261 6,261 6,261 6,261
Schwarz criterion 6,36 6,363 6,268 6,268 6,271 6,27
Durbin-Watson stat 2,302 2,286 2,39 2,374 2,39 2,416
Panel  C: Hedge Funds
 0,006 −1,09 0,006 −1,09 −0,061 −0,991
t-   0,081 −15,383 0,084 −15,396 −0,921 −6,947
m 0,104 0,104 0,108 0,107 0,039 0,038
t-statstics 7,815 7,723 8,029 7,935 2,902 2,845
smb 0,003 0,003 −0,006 −0,004
t-statstics 0,168 0,154 −0,345 −0,855
hml 0,055 0,055 0,039 0,039
t-statstics 2,461 1,875 1,855
mom 0,26 0,26
t-statstics 16,293 16,15
Adjusted R-squared 0,029 0,029 0,031 0,031 0,146 0,143
F-statistic 61,072 59,644 22,425 21,908 85,433 83,792
Prob(F-statistic) 000 000 000 000 000 000
Akaike  info criterion 5,121 5,141 5,125 5,145 5,003 5,025
c
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sSchwarz criterion 5,117 5,137 5,118 5,138 4,994 5,016
Durbin-Watson stat 1,998 1,959 2 1,96 1,961 1,918
In this section, we use a panel bootstrap procedure to separate ‘skill’ from ‘luck’ for individual funds even when idiosyn-
ratic risks are not normal, as is the case for funds in the extreme tails with negative or positive estimated alphas, which
nvestors are particularly interested in. We continue to use the four-factor market model as the ‘true model’ of expected
und returns. In our sample that consists 185 funds, there will always be some funds that perform well or poorly, merely due
o good or bad luck. We  report two test statistics, namely, the estimated alpha, which measures the proportions of abnormal
erformance, and the estimated t-statistic of alpha, which has superior sampling properties. We  have also examined other
epresentative models (not shown), and the results are consistent with those presented and are available from the author
pon request.
Table 5 shows bootstrap results for all funds, which includes all investment objective funds (panel A), equity funds (Panel
) and hedge funds (panel C), all of which use the four-factor model. We  would expect the coefﬁcient alpha to be mono-
onically increasing from left to right because the quantile regression effectively sorts according to average performance; it
s interpreted as the expected performance if the fund had zero exposure to all risk factors. The ﬁrst column in each panel
hows the quantile ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. The second column in each panel shows the fund’s alpha (% per month) ranked
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Table 4
Panel least square estimation of excess return of Swedish Mutual Funds, Equity Funds and Hedge Funds, for sub-periods.
Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Equity Funds Panel C: Hedge Funds
2007M032010M02 2010M032015M02 2007M032010M02 2010M032015M02 2007M032010M02 2010M03 2015M02
Gross NET Gross Net Gross NET Gross Net Gross NET Gross Net
 −0,061 −0,298 0,078 −0,160 0,318 −1,631 0,740 −0,27 0,099 −0,991 −0,181 −1,285
t-   −1,047 −5,145 2,299 −4,719 6,768 −8,698 32,15 −2,56 0,716 −6,947 −2,569 −17,93
m 0,502 0,502 0,475 0,475 0,001 0,016 0,000 0,026 0,049 0,050 0,031 0,031
t-statstics 46,100 46,100 31,155 31,155 0,073 0,481 0,071 1,067 2,237 2,212 1,827 1,798
smb 0,110 0,110 0,063 0,063 0,042 0,661 −0,05 −0,15 0,000 0,001 −0,003 −0,003
t-statstics 8,164 8,164 5,352 5,352 4,295 16,827 −5,91 −3,72 1,002 0,025 0,165 −0,162
hml −0,038 −0,021 0,050 0,050 0,154 −0,225 −0,02 −0,28 0,108 0,110 −0,027 −0,027
t-statstics −2,590 −2,13 5,595 5,595 11,480 −4,257 −3,25 −7,33 2,864 2,860 −1,136 −1,117
mom 0,051 0,051 0,041 0,041 0,016 0,009 −0,03 0,022 0,243 0,241 0,296 0,296
t-statstics 3,340 3,340 2,286 2,286 1,605 0,221 −0,42 0,797 8,990 8,376 15,375 15,124
AR2 0,388 0,388 0,271 0,271 0,096 0,218 0,018 0,028 0,144 0,137 0,163 0,159
F-statistic 1054,0 1054,0 1034,9 1034,9 35,2 85,6 10,7 16,5 32,125 29,740 62,408 60,385
Prob  0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Akaike 5,915 5,915 5,268 5,268 3,907 6,616 2,956 6,616 5,484 5,510 4,575 4,608
Schwarz 5,911 5,911 5,266 5,266 3,895 6,603 2,948 6,603 5,464 5,491 4,562 4,595
DW  2,030 2,030 2,309 2,309 1,784 1,860 1,950 1,860 1,877 1,833 2,100 2,032
Table 5
Bootstrap Results of Swedish Mutual Funds Performance (February 2007–March 2015).
Quantile Coefﬁcient Std. Error tStatistic Prob. Quantile Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
All Investment categories Gross Net
0.100 −4,595 0,068 −67,405 0 0,1 −4,649 0,062 −75,173 0
0.200  −2,606 0,046 −56,393 0 0,2 −2,764 0,044 −62,472 0
0.300  −1,388 0,036 −39,013 0 0,3 −1,599 0,035 −45,656 0
0.400  −0,577 0,029 −19,944 0 0,4 −0,798 0,028 −28,426 0
0.500  0,139 0,026 5,257 0 0,5 −0,093 0,026 −3,523 0,0004
0.600  0,825 0,026 31,219 0 0,6 0,607 0,027 22,715 0
0.700  1,601 0,029 54,485 0 0,7 1,397 0,03 46,633 0
0.800  2,591 0,036 71,566 0 0,8 2,416 0,038 64,118 0
0.900  4,317 0,054 79,214 0 0,9 4,214 0,058 72,755 0
Equity  Funds
0.100 −5,898 0,232 −25,399 0 0,1 −6,995 0,196 −35,746 0
0.200  −3,691 0,102 −36,287 0 0,2 −4,762 0,113 −42,291 0
0.300  −2,209 0,131 −16,858 0 0,3 −3,211 0,121 −26,505 0
0.400  −0,723 0,11 −6,549 0 0,4 −1,863 0,109 −17,157 0
0.500  0,471 0,099 4,773 0 0,5 −0,674 0,098 −6,896 0
0.600  1,617 0,092 17,625 0 0,6 0,432 0,094 4,607 0
0.700  2,584 0,089 29,17 0 0,7 1,513 0,091 16,578 0
0.800  3,929 0,111 35,517 0 0,8 2,783 0,111 25,146 0
0.900  6,375 0,19 33,512 0 0,9 5,266 0,18 29,204 0
Hedge  Funds
0.100 −2,841 0,155 −18,34 0 0,1 −4,04 0,159 −25,338 0
0.200  −1,163 0,085 −13,61 0 0,2 −2,425 0,083 −29,096 0
0.300  −0,497 0,04 −12,279 0 0,3 −1,68 0,055 −30,796 0
0.400  −0,235 0,028 −8,307 0 0,4 −1,28 0,039 −32,464 0
0.500  −0,025 0,028 −0,889 0,374 0,5 −0,982 0,039 −25,413 0
0.600  0,269 0,037 7,282 0 0,6 −0,589 0,044 −13,348 0
0.700  0,674 0,05 13,518 0 0,7 −0,189 0,048 −3,899 0,0001
0.800  1,425 0,09 15,826 0 0,8 0,417 0,069 6,035 0
0.900  2,809 0,147 19,103 0 0,9 1,667 0,142 11,774 0
from lowest to highest, and it is associated with standard error (the third column). The fourth column in each panel shows
t-statistics of the alpha ranked from lowest to highest. Column 5 (Prop.) reports the bootstrap p-values of the t-statistics
shown in column 4 based on the luck distribution under the null hypothesis of no zero abnormal performance.
The results for all funds (Panel A) states that the best fund ranked by alpha from the four-factor model achieved an
abnormal gross return of 4.317% with an associated conventional t of 79.214 and a bootstrap p-value of 0.000. Thus, we
reject the null hypothesis that the best fund, with t = 79.214, can be explained by luck alone. In the left tail of the distribution,
the worst ranked fund by alpha yields a negative gross return of −4.595, with an associated t of −67.405 and a bootstrap
p-value of 0.000. Hence, for the ex-post worst fund with t of −67.405, there is zero probability that this is due to bad luck
rather than bad skill. Similarly, the best fund ranked by alpha realized an abnormal net return of 4.214%, with an associated
t of 72.755 and a bootstrap p-value of 0.000. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the best funds can be explained by
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uck alone. In the left tail of the distribution, the worst ranked fund by alpha yields a negative net return of −4.649, with an
ssociated t of −75.173 and a bootstrap p-value of 0.000. Thus, for the ex-post worst fund, there is zero probability that
his is due to bad luck rather than bad skill.
The results for equity funds (Panel B) show a pattern similar to the results above. For example, the best equity fund ranked
y alpha realized an abnormal gross return of 6.375% with an associated t of 33.512 and a bootstrap p-value of 0.000. Hence,
e reject the null hypothesis that the best equity funds can be explained by luck alone. In the left tail of the distribution,
he worst ranked equity fund by alpha yields a negative gross return of −5.898, with a conventional t of −25.399 and a
ootstrap p-value of 0.000, thus suggesting bad skill. Similarly, the best fund ranked by alpha realized an abnormal net return
f 5.266%, with an associated t of 29.204 and a bootstrap p-value of 0.000. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the best
unds can be explained by luck alone. In the left tail of the distribution, the worst ranked fund by alpha yields a negative
ross return of −6.995, with an associated t of −35.746 and a bootstrap p-value of 0.000. Hence, for the ex-post worst fund,
here is zero probability that this is due to bad luck rather than bad skill. Based on the results for hedge funds (Panel C), we
lso reject the null hypothesis that the best and the worst funds abnormal gross and net returns can be explained by luck.
These results should be interpreted with caution in light of the model by Berk and Van Binsbergen (2013), who demon-
trated that the gross and net alpha fail to measure managerial skill. They propose using the value that a mutual fund extracts
rom capital markets as the true measure of managerial skill. With different values associated with the panel least squares
nd regression quantile estimates, it is important to ask which estimate best reﬂects the fund’s true managerial skills. The
nswer largely depends on how we deﬁne skills. Is skill measured by the persistency of the average abnormal return, or is
t best indicated by how the different risk factors inﬂuence the return’s distribution? The answer is that there is no single
easure that describes skill. Thus, we advocate combining our statistical performance analysis and evaluation of risk factors
ith other tests that better address managers’ skill.
.5. Managerial skill and market efﬁciency
Our results for picking capability have strong implications for excess return predictability and market efﬁciency. It may
e argued that if a market is fully efﬁcient and any new information is directly and correctly incorporated into ﬁnancial
arkets, it would be impossible for any fund manager to persistently outperform the market. Thus, if a manager has talent,
ast returns predict future returns.
In this section, we combine statistical performance analysis with predictability capabilities for a better measure of man-
gerial skill by testing for market efﬁciency based on random walk tests. We  use three tests to avoid a spurious result from
elying on only one test, namely, the serial correlation, unit root, and variance ration tests.
.5.1. Serial correlation of excess return
An intuitive test of the random walk for an individual time series is used to check for serial correlation. If the excess returns
xhibit a random walk, it should be uncorrelated at all leads and lags. The Durbin-Watson statistic, which tests whether the
esiduals from a linear regression are independent, is commonly used to test for serial correlation. The Durbin-Waston test
s based on the assumption that the error in Eq. (3) is generated by a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process observed at equally
paced time periods, that is,
t = t−1 + ˛t (4)
here (t) is the error term in the model at time t, t is an NID(0, 2) random variable, and  is the autocorrelation parameter.
he null hypothesis is H0:  = 0, and its alternative hypothesis is H1:  > 0. A value of 2 means that there is no autocorrelation
n the sample. As shown in Table 3, the values of the Durbin-Watson statistic are below 2; therefore, we  reject the null
ypothesis of zero autocorrelation.3
.5.2. Unit root tests
Our second test of the random walk property is for the presence of a unit root in the excess return series. A pure random
alk can be expressed as an AR (1) where the value of excess return at time “t”, rt, is equal to the last period value plus a
tochastic (non-systematic) component that is assumed to be white noise t , which means t is independent and identically
istributed with mean “0” and variance ¨2¨. That is:
rt = rt−1 + t (5)
A unit root requires that  = 1, and the excess return series is said to follow a random walk and is not stationary. In other
ords, it is a non-mean-reverting process that can move away from the mean either on a negative or positive path. Another
eature of a random walk is that the variance changes over time and goes to inﬁnity as time goes to inﬁnity; therefore, a
andom walk cannot be predicted.
Table 6 shows the results of the panel unit root test for gross and net excess returns using two groups of tests. The ﬁrst is
he Levin, Lin and Chu statistics, which assume a common unit root process. The second is Im,  Pesaran and Shin, ADF-Fisher
3 One can also use Box-Pierce Q or Ljung-Box t statistics to test the joint hypothesis that all serial coefﬁcients  (t) are simultaneously equal to zero.
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Table 6
Panel Unit Root test for Swedish Mutual Funds Excess Return: February 2007–February 2015.
Gross Return Net Return
Method Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t −133.384 0.0000 −133.384 0.0000 185 17496
Null:  Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat −125.111 0.0000 −125.111 0.0000 185 17496
ADF  – Fisher Chi-square 5554.15 0.0000 5554.15 0.0000 185 17496
PP  – Fisher Chi-square 5790.58 0.0000 5790.58 0.0000 185 17569
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. We use automatic
selection of maximum lags, automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 11, and Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel.
Table 7
Variance Ratio Test for Swedish Mutual Funds Excess Return: February 2007–February 2015.
Null Hypothesis: Excess Return is a random walk Gross Return Net Return
Statistics Max  |z| Prob. Max  |z| Prob. Wald Prob.
Fisher Combined 4976.5 0.0000 2027.1 0.0000 3880.6 0.0000Cross-sections included: 185, total panel observations: 17569 (after adjustments), Standard error estimates assume no heteroscedasticity, Use biased
variance estimates, User-speciﬁed lags: 2 4 8 16.
and PP-Fisher statistics, which assume an individual unit root process. In all these tests, the null hypothesis is H0: The excess
return series has a unit root. The alternative hypothesis is H1: The excess return series has no unit root. As shown in the
table, the probability values in all tests are zero; thus, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the excess return series is rejected
(i.e., the series is stationary). That is, the random walk model is strongly rejected for both gross and net excess returns and
for the entire sample period (2007–2015). These results suggest that the mutual funds’ excess returns contain predictable
components.
4.5.3. Variance ratio test
Our ﬁnal test of the random walk property is examined using the variance ratio test. Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1989)
used the variance ratio test to examine the predictability of returns data by comparing the variance in the differences of the
returns calculated over diverse intervals. If the returns follow a random walk, the variance of a q-period difference should be
q times the variance of the one-period difference. They argue that under a heteroscedastic random walk null, the variance
ratio test is more reliable than either the Dickey-Fuller or Box-Pierce tests.
We use two groups of tests, the “joint” variance ratio test applied to all funds and the “individual” variance ratio test
applied to individual funds from 1 to 185. In all these tests, the null hypothesis is H0: The excess return series is a random
walk. Its alternative hypothesis is H1: The excess return series does not follow a random walk.
Table 7 presents the results of the “joint” variance ratio test applied to all funds’ gross and net excess returns using
the Fisher combined test statistics and the common procedure of selecting lags 2, 4, 8 and 16 for homoscedastic and het-
eroskedastic random walks with asymptotic normal distribution. As shown in the table, the Chow-Denning maximum |z|
statistic of 4976.5 is associated with a p-value of 0.000–obtained using the studentized maximum modulus with inﬁnite
degrees of freedom – which strongly rejects the null of a random walk. Fig. 2a and b show the variance ratio statistics for gross
and net excess returns, respectively, plus or minus two asymptotic standard error bands, along with a horizontal reference
line at 1 representing the null hypothesis. The diagrams show that the null reference line lies outside the bands for all funds,
which again strongly rejects the null of a random walk.
Table 8 shows the results of the “individual” or cross-section variance ratio tests for gross and net excess returns. We
allowed a heteroskedastic robust S.E and Wild bootstrap with two-point distribution, 5000 replications, the Knuth generator,
and a seed for the random number generator of 1,000. For gross access returns, except for four funds (2, 18, 32, and 62), the
p-value is less than 5%, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of a random walk. Similarly, for net access returns, except
for 18 funds, the p-value is less than 5%, which strongly rejects the joint null hypothesis of a random walk.
In sum, the above results suggest that there are quite a few funds whose managers outperformed the bootstrapping
technique after adjusting for costs and risks. These outliers may  retain skill upon identiﬁcation. Unfortunately, knowing that
a manager had skill ex post does not help investors greatly because investors need to invest ex ante, and it is not possible to
determine the managers that will be successful in the future.
5. ConclusionMutual funds are a key factor in Swedish capital market. Few studies have been done to investigate the performance of
the Swedish mutual fund industry, despite its vast and growing size and importance in recent years. Therefore, this paper
partially ﬁlls the gap by employing three structural models to evaluate the performance of 185 Swedish funds across different
M
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Table 8
Variance Ratio Test for Swedish Mutual Funds Excess Return: February 2007–February 2015.
Cross-section Joint Tests
Gross NET Gross NET Gross NET Gross NET Gross NET
Fund Max |z| Prob. Max  |z| Prob. Fund Max |z| Prob. Max  |z| Prob. Fund Max |z| Prob. Max  |z| Prob. Fund Max  |z| Prob. Max |z| Prob. Fund Max  |z| Prob. Max  |z| Prob.
1 3,576 0,002 3,503 0,021 38 3,541 0,002 3,478 0,018 75 3,541 0,002 3,469 0,020 112 3,620 0,002 3,549 0,018 149 3,105 0,003 3,001 0,032
2  4,930 0,061a 4,839 0,056a 39 3,360 0,004 3,298 0,023 76 3,112 0,005 3,034 0,037 113 2,618 0,010 2,579 0,055a 150 3,528 0,003 3,449 0,023
3  3,854 0,001 3,790 0,014 40 1,715 0,029 1,687 0,080 77 2,256 0,018 2,212 0,075a 114 3,024 0,004 2,933 0,035 151 1,936 0,043 1,891 0,159a
4 3,143 0,001 3,082 0,026 41 3,567 0,001 3,492 0,019 78 3,583 0,002 3,508 0,015 115 3,127 0,002 3,036 0,020 152 3,128 0,004 3,035 0,037
5  3,331 0,001 3,272 0,018 42 3,585 0,002 3,517 0,015 79 3,116 0,004 3,034 0,036 116 2,710 0,004 2,614 0,026 153 2,345 0,014 2,287 0,075a
6 3,543 0,002 3,472 0,019 43 3,464 0,002 3,401 0,022 80 3,310 0,004 3,254 0,027 117 3,777 0,001 3,680 0,009 154 2,849 0,005 2,766 0,028
7  1,892 0,033 1,852 0,143a 44 3,184 0,001 3,098 0,023 81 3,321 0,001 3,265 0,019 118 3,809 0,000 3,733 0,016 155 2,758 0,008 2,697 0,050
8  3,867 0,001 3,803 0,014 45 3,283 0,003 3,213 0,025 82 3,089 0,004 3,016 0,036 119 3,170 0,003 3,112 0,023 156 3,647 0,002 3,594 0,020
9  1,973 0,050 1,919 0,149a 46 3,153 0,002 3,074 0,030 83 3,516 0,001 3,451 0,020 120 2,288 0,013 2,238 0,058a 157 3,465 0,003 3,397 0,022
10  3,413 0,002 3,356 0,025 47 1,631 0,062 1,594 0,226a 84 3,047 0,005 2,999 0,033 121 3,226 0,006 3,165 0,031 158 3,553 0,002 3,488 0,021
11  2,855 0,007 2,774 0,053 48 2,551 0,004 2,503 0,051a 85 3,332 0,002 3,274 0,022 122 3,562 0,001 3,497 0,019 159 3,805 0,001 3,730 0,018
12  3,602 0,002 3,534 0,020 49 3,596 0,001 3,518 0,018 86 3,478 0,002 3,419 0,019 123 3,418 0,001 3,354 0,023 160 2,525 0,010 2,468 0,075a
13 3,030 0,007 2,972 0,038 50 2,669 0,006 2,571 0,036 87 3,741 0,001 3,678 0,010 124 3,551 0,001 3,488 0,020 161 4,130 0,000 4,072 0,002
14  3,426 0,002 3,365 0,020 51 3,369 0,004 3,299 0,017 88 3,477 0,002 3,419 0,018 125 3,333 0,002 3,259 0,024 162 3,811 0,000 3,720 0,008
15  3,052 0,006 2,975 0,036 52 3,751 0,001 3,689 0,011 89 3,350 0,003 3,294 0,025 126 2,859 0,006 2,797 0,032 163 3,561 0,001 3,507 0,014
16  3,252 0,001 3,198 0,023 53 3,081 0,006 3,014 0,036 90 3,505 0,001 3,444 0,018 127 2,605 0,011 2,557 0,035 164 3,244 0,004 3,180 0,030
17  3,743 0,001 3,676 0,018 54 3,150 0,002 3,088 0,022 91 3,485 0,002 3,425 0,022 128 3,181 0,005 3,116 0,028 165 3,285 0,003 3,208 0,031
18  1,737 0,062a 1,698 0,19a 55 3,404 0,002 3,349 0,022 92 2,987 0,006 2,907 0,040 129 3,401 0,001 3,330 0,020 166 3,584 0,002 3,515 0,017
19  3,814 0,001 3,749 0,014 56 2,988 0,006 2,937 0,034 93 3,142 0,004 3,075 0,030 130 3,200 0,003 3,118 0,024 167 3,444 0,001 3,377 0,025
20  3,404 0,002 3,346 0,018 57 3,164 0,005 3,110 0,031 94 3,837 0,001 3,743 0,011 131 3,453 0,002 3,390 0,023 168 1,932 0,029 1,891 0,154a
21 3,564 0,001 3,500 0,012 58 3,319 0,003 3,263 0,025 95 2,859 0,009 2,800 0,049 132 3,802 0,001 3,738 0,017 169 3,931 0,001 3,832 0,009
22  2,993 0,003 2,921 0,039 59 3,322 0,003 3,267 0,021 96 3,709 0,000 3,624 0,013 133 3,171 0,002 3,099 0,027 170 3,243 0,003 3,167 0,026
23  3,837 0,000 3,751 0,012 60 2,916 0,006 2,838 0,043 97 3,953 0,001 3,897 0,006 134 3,293 0,001 3,230 0,009 171 3,503 0,002 3,434 0,017
24  3,099 0,005 3,021 0,033 61 3,613 0,002 3,549 0,017 98 3,791 0,001 3,731 0,013 135 2,424 0,009 2,372 0,066a 172 3,466 0,002 3,398 0,015
25  3,579 0,001 3,500 0,018 62 2,813 0,009 2,746 0,048 99 3,335 0,003 3,278 0,022 136 2,363 0,013 2,323 0,064a 173 3,417 0,001 3,367 0,016
26  3,342 0,002 3,289 0,020 63 3,341 0,002 3,270 0,028 100 3,386 0,002 3,315 0,024 137 3,749 0,001 3,683 0,018 174 3,524 0,002 3,461 0,017
27  3,291 0,002 3,218 0,023 64 3,778 0,001 3,724 0,015 101 3,401 0,001 3,313 0,015 138 3,519 0,001 3,458 0,011 175 3,600 0,002 3,530 0,018
28  4,222 0,000 4,156 0,010 65 3,582 0,000 3,515 0,017 102 3,312 0,002 3,251 0,019 139 1,876 0,049 1,841 0,15a 176 3,365 0,004 3,300 0,031
29  3,316 0,004 3,239 0,033 66 3,467 0,002 3,394 0,024 103 3,801 0,001 3,735 0,013 140 3,499 0,002 3,426 0,023 177 3,484 0,002 3,420 0,025
30  3,690 0,001 3,613 0,015 67 1,390 0,18a 1,354 0,325a 104 3,195 0,004 3,149 0,020 141 4,735 0,000 4,653 0,002 178 3,931 0,001 3,869 0,015
31  3,276 0,002 3,215 0,026 68 2,653 0,011 2,588 0,061a 105 3,462 0,002 3,408 0,015 142 2,861 0,008 2,790 0,045 179 3,756 0,000 3,695 0,011
32  1,231 0,128a 1,205 0,365a 69 3,814 0,000 3,737 0,010 106 3,297 0,003 3,234 0,027 143 4,016 0,000 3,939 0,002 180 3,675 0,001 3,613 0,017
33  3,524 0,002 3,468 0,018 70 3,542 0,001 3,482 0,014 107 3,220 0,003 3,120 0,031 144 1,765 0,038 1,733 0,13a 181 4,054 0,000 4,000 0,011
34  3,470 0,001 3,409 0,015 71 3,328 0,002 3,264 0,021 108 2,831 0,008 2,768 0,049 145 3,982 0,001 3,925 0,007 182 3,449 0,002 3,385 0,025
35  3,794 0,000 3,745 0,009 72 3,744 0,001 3,680 0,014 109 4,203 0,000 4,124 0,005 146 3,879 0,001 3,819 0,008 183 3,404 0,001 3,338 0,016
36  3,476 0,001 3,412 0,022 73 3,704 0,002 3,643 0,014 110 2,291 0,040 2,244 0,091 147 4,413 0,000 4,326 0,004 184 3,561 0,001 3,480 0,021
37  4,480 0,000 4,411 0,006 74 3,407 0,002 3,350 0,020 111 4,035 0,001 3,966 0,011 148 2,425 0,018 2,369 0,083a 185 3,405 0,002 3,335 0,022
Null Hypothesis: EXCESSRINET is a martingale. Sample: 2007M02 2015M02. Cross-sections included: 185, total panel observations: 17569 (after adjustments), Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates,
User-speciﬁed lags: 2 4 8 16, and test probabilities computed using wild bootstrap: dist=Two-point, reps=5000, rng=kn, seed=1000.
a Refers to fail to reject the random walk hypothesis.
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investment styles from February 2007 to March 2015. We also use a pooled panel bootstrap methodology to distinguish
between ‘luck’ and ‘skill’ for individual funds. The ﬁnding can be summarized as follows. First, the evidence on mutual fund
performance indicates that these 185 mutual funds were on average not able to outperform their bench-marks, net of costs
(i.e. after subtracting the expense ratio). Second, the vast majority of individual funds yield a negative net excess return
and only a few equity funds succeeded in generating a positive net excess return. Third, consistent with Kosowski et al.
(2006), Cuthbertson et al. (2008), Berk and Van Binsbergen (2013), and Berk and Green (2004) and in contrast to Fama
and French (2010), our bootstrap analysis reveals that very few managers outperform the market and too many managers
underperform the market due to good and bad skills. In other words, our result rejects the hypothesis that poor performing
funds are simply unlucky. At the positive end of the performance spectrum, our result indicates the presence of picking
ability among a very few number of top performing Swedish equity funds (i.e. performance which is not merely due to good
luck). To check robustness, we examined the predictability and market efﬁciency for Swedish fund markets using different
tests. Our results show that excess returns (both net and gross) are predictable on average, which supports the view of good
and bad skills rather than fund managers’ luck.
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